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Abstract. Due to the widespread application of augmented and virtual
environments, the research into 3D content protection is fundamentally
important. To maintain confidentiality, encryption of 3D content, in-
cluding the 3D objects and texture images, is essential. In this paper,
a novel texture encryption scheme is proposed which complements the
existing 3D object encryption methods. The proposed method encrypts
texture images by bit masking and a permutation procedure using the
Salsa20/12 stream cipher. The method is lightweight and satisfies the
security requirement. It also prevents the partial disclosure of the en-
crypted 3D surface geometry by protecting the texture patterns from
being partially leaked. The scheme has a better speed-security profile
than the full encryption and the selective (4 most significant bit-plane)
encryption by 128-bit AES. The encryption schemes are implemented
and tested with 500 sample texture images. The experimental results
show that the scheme has a better encryption performance compared to
the full/selective encryption by 128-bit AES.
Keywords: Texture image, 3D object, encryption, Salsa Dance, permu-
tation, lightweightedness, security
1 Introduction
Virtual reality and augmented reality are about to become explosive growth
markets. Over the past decade, a substantial investment and a wide range of ex-
citing prototypes have been made from the tech heavyweights such as Microsoft
and Google. It is anticipated that the market for virtual reality and augmented
reality will reach $1.06 billion by 2018 at a Compound Annual Growth Rate
(CAGR) of 15.18% from 2013 to 2018 [1]. The growing applicability of 3D con-
tent and its potential revenue suggest the necessity for protecting such assets.
The privacy-sensitive content in 3D environments, such as Second Life, are in
risk of being recorded or monitored by malicious entities [2]. This allows man-
ufacturing and selling real (counterfeit) objects, which is a great loss for their
owner. A solution to this problem is encryption. Since the 1970s, a large number
of encryption schemes have been proposed, some of which have been standard-
ized and adopted worldwide, such as Data Encryption Standard (DES) [3] and
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [4]. However, the problem of 3D content
encryption is beyond the simple application of established and well-known en-
cryption algorithms. This is primarily due to the constraints imposed by the
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data structure and the application requirements, such as content usability, for-
mat compliance, real-time performance, complexity, and the security level. To
address these concerns, several attempts have been made to develop robust en-
cryption schemes for 3D content [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. However, all these efforts
are mainly focused on the encryption of 3D models rather than texture images.
Texture images are fundamental drawing primitives that add realism to com-
puter graphics by improving surface details. Notionally, a texture image is a 2D
image that is wrapped onto the geometry of a 3D model, to give the illusion of a
specified pattern to the complex object [10]. Texture images contain intelligible
information due to the strong correlation among adjacent elements. As each el-
ement is assigned to a particular vertex, texture patterns provide strong cues to
the surface orientation, curvature and 3D surface geometry. Therefore, there is a
strong correlation between the geodesic distance between pairs of points on the
surface and the distance between corresponding pairs of points in the texture
image[11]. This relationship provides a lot of information about the 3D geometry.
Also, texture leakage may lead to a disclosure of the 3D surface geometry. It is
therefore necessary to confuse this relationship by encrypting the texture image.
Texture encryption is a subclass of image encryption in which maintaining
the real-time rendering performance, and preventing the partial disclosure of the
3D surface geometry by the texture pattern, are principally important in addi-
tion to providing confidentiality for texture images. These requirements may
not be an issue in many image or video applications, but they are vital for most
3D applications. To meet these requirements, it is more important to obfuscate
the coarse pattern rather than the detail of the texture image. This can reduce
the capability of a competent adversary to reconstruct 3D objects exploiting
the texture images. Also, it is necessary to keep encryption complexity as low
as possible to save resources, such as computation, memory and bandwidth.
One potential solution to the problem of texture encryption is in the use of a
lightweight encryption scheme with a high level of security, tailored for main-
taining the real-time performances. Using this idea, this paper proposes a novel
texture encryption scheme that satisfies the need for both lightweightedness
and security. The proposed cipher uses Salsa20/12 [12] as its core encryption
primitive. Salsa20 is one of the finalists of the eSTREAM project [13] and is
constructed by a simple and scalable design, which is appropriate for software
implementations. Although Salsa20 has not received its deserved attention com-
pared to AES, it has good potential for being used in multimedia applications,
in which high-speed encryption is required. It is shown that in comparison with
full encryption methods using the 128-bit AES, the proposed texture encryption
method provides comparable level of security but with much faster performance.
Also, compared to selective encryption methods [14], in which only a subset of
the input bitstream is encrypted using the 128-bit AES, the proposed texture
encryption method is much faster and more secure because it protects the entire
input bitstream. Furthermore, it is shown that Salsa Dance conceals the shape
and boundaries of underlying 3D objects, while the full and selective encryption
using AES cannot protect such information.
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This is the first paper that proposes a technical solution for the confidential-
ity problem of texture images. Although many image encryption methods have
been proposed in the literature, they are not designed primarily for address-
ing the technical requirements of 3D applications. In this paper, the proposed
encryption scheme is compared with AES, because AES is currently the main
industrial encryption standard used in many multimedia applications. AES is a
well-studied cipher and no practical attack has been found against it to date.
In addition, AES is fast and on a Core 2 architecture, for example, runs around
12 cycles/byte for long streams. This speed is quite fast compared to other mul-
timedia operations such as compression (For instance, Lempel-Zev and ZLIB
Compressions). However, it is shown that AES cannot sufficiently address the
confidentiality requirements of texture images, and therefore texture images en-
crypted by AES may leak crucial information about the protected 3D models.
It is also shown that in comparison with AES, the proposed encryption scheme
not only maintains the confidentiality of texture images but also maintains the
security of protected 3D models from surface reconstruction attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
encryption and decryption procedures. In Section 3, the performance of the pro-
posed cipher is evaluated. Section 4 evaluates the security of the cipher from the
data level and the semantic level. Finally, Section 5 concludes that the proposed
texture encryption method is secure, relatively lightweight and prevents the par-
tial disclosure of the protected 3D surface geometry by the texture pattern.
2 Proposed Texture Encryption Scheme
In a true color (24-bit) representation, 94.125% of the total information is stored
in the upper nibbles (4 bit-planes) of the texture image. This suggests employ-
ing a strict strategy to encrypt the upper nibbles and a lenient scheme for the
encryption of lower nibbles. This approach improves the encryption performance
and reduces the memory usage. The proposed scheme encrypts the upper nibble-
image using a fast stream cipher, that is, Salsa20/12 [12], and scrambles the bit
stream of the lower nibble-image by a zigzag pattern permutation. This mecha-
nism is consistent with the movement performed in the (Latin American) Salsa
dance. We therefore call our encryption mechanism ‘Salsa Dance’.
To elaborate the steps of the encryption algorithm, denote by P the plain-
image, N the nibble-image, and C the cipher-image. In a 24-bit true color
representation, each plain-image, nibble-image or cipher-image is represented
by three M ×N matrices, namely, R, G, and B color layers. In any color layer
of RGB, for any x (1 6 x 6 M), and y (1 6 y 6 N), let p (x, y), n (x, y)
and c (x, y), be the entry value at the position (x, y) of the plain-image, nibble-
image and cipher-image, respectively. p (x, y) and c (x, y) ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 255}, and
n (x, y) ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 15}.
The encryption procedure is described as follows, for one color layer of a 24-bit
texture image. The encryption procedure is the same for the other color layers.
Firstly, the plain-image is divided into two nibble-images, which areN1 andN2,
by splitting every entry into upper and lower nibbles. For any x (1 6 x 6 M)
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and y (1 6 y 6 N), n1 (x, y) and n2 (x, y) are defined as follows:
n1 (x, y) = p (x, y) mod 2
4, (1)
n2 (x, y) = (p (x, y)− n1 (x, y)) · 2−4. (2)
In the upper nibble-image encryption, the binary stream of the upper-nibble
images with size M × 4N is masked with a binary stream of the same size
generated by the Salsa20/12 stream cipher. This procedure not only protects
the coarse shape (major information) of the texture images from being leaked,
but also prevents the disclosure of the 3D surface geometry. In the lower nibble-
image encryption, the lower nibble-image is first extended to a bit-plane image
with size M × 4N , which is constructed by expanding every column of the lower
nibble-image into 4 bit-plane columns. The bit-plane image then undergoes a
bit-level zigzag pattern permutation process Perm(·). Displacement of the bit
locations not only annihilates the high correlation among the nibbles but also
increases the security level of the encrypted texture images. This process is as
follows:
Assume that the entries of the bit-plane image are scanned in a raster order
and they are enumerated by positive integers. Let R denote the matrix of the
entry (bit) locations, that is,
R=

0 M · · · 4MN −M
1 M + 1 · · · 4MN −M + 1
...
...
...
...
M − 1 2M − 1 · · · 4MN − 1
 . (3)
An additional binary sequence of length dlog2(4MN)e with value s is iterated
by Salsa20/12. Then, mod (s,MN) is used to select an entry in the bit-plane
image, which determines the starting point for the zigzag-pattern permutation
of the entries. To clarify further, Figure 1 shows a zigzag path for the scanning
of entries in a bit-plane image with size 3 × 4. In Figure 1.a, if mod (s, 12) = 7,
then the entry scanning commences from the 7-th entry, and stops at the 9-th
entry which is previous to the initial one, that is 7. During the scanning process,
bits encountered in the path are arranged sequentially, column by column in
the same matrix. On completion of the permutation process, not only is every
bit dislocated (diffusion), but also nibble values are modified (confusion) within
the bit-plane image. For mod (s, 12) = 7, the permutation result of the test bit-
plane image is depicted in Figure 1.b. Following the permutation process, the
encrypted lower nibble-image with size M × N is reconstructed by combining
every 4 consecutive columns of the scrambled bit-plane image. Finally, the cipher-
image is constructed by the radix 24 combination of the encrypted upper and
lower nibble-images.
In summary, the whole encryption process E (·) is as follows:
P = 24 ·N2 +N1, (4)
C = E (P ) = 24 · E2 (N2) + E1 (N1) , (5)
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) A zigzag path to scramble bits of a bit-plane image, (b) Permutation result
of the bit-plane image for mod (s, 12) = 7.
where
E2 (N2) = Salsa20/12 (N2) , (6)
E1 (N1) = Perm (N1) . (7)
P , N1, N2, and C denote the plain-image, lower nibble-image, upper nibble-
image and the cipher-image, respectively. In decryption, the cipher-image is di-
vided into lower and upper nibble-images. The upper nibble-image is decrypted
by the same key stream used in encryption, and the lower nibble-image is de-
crypted by the inverse permutation procedure. Note that in 24-bit texture images
there is a strong correlation among different color layers of the image. Therefore,
encryption of different color layers using the same key may reveal the underly-
ing pattern. To address this issue, Salsa20/12 has a 64-bit nonce which changes
after each color layer encryption. This ensures that whenever the same message
is encrypted twice, the ciphertext is always different. If the same nonce and key
are used to encrypt two different plaintexts, then the keystream can be cancelled
out by masking the two different ciphertexts together.
3 Performance Analysis
To evaluate the performance of the proposed cipher, we implemented: (i) the
full encryption by 128-bit AES, (ii) selective encryption of the 4 most significant
bit-planes using 128-bit AES, and (iii) Salsa Dance, on a machine with Intel
Core 2 2.4 GHz processor and 4 GB of installed memory. In this paper, the
ECB mode of AES algorithm has been chosen to encrypt the texture images.
AES supports several modes of operation, among which ECB allows parallelised
encryption/decryption and achieves better performance with trivial sequential
message scheduling [15]. It is also suitable for applications that require random
read/write to encrypted data. We tested the encryption performance using 500
sample texture images from CGTextures [16]. Figure 2 shows one test texture
image with its corresponding encryption results. It is observed that Salsa Dance
dissipates the correlation among the entries of the texture image while the full
and selective encryption using AES cannot annihilate the coarse pattern of the
texture image.
In the proposed encryption method, 24-bit texture images with size MN
(that is, 24 MN bits in total) are encrypted by a pseudorandom binary se-
quence with size 12MN + 3dlog2 (4MN)e. In other words, the proposed cipher
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2. Encryption results of a sample texture image: (a) Original image, (b) encrypted
image using full AES, (c) encrypted image using selective AES, (d) encrypted image
using Salsa Dance.
Table 1. Comparison of the relative CPU time
Encryption schemes Relative CPU time
Selective AES 2.47
Full AES 4.95
Proposed (Salsa Dance) 1.00
encrypts the input data by generating a pseudorandom sequence with the size
of almost 50% of the data. This means that compared to conventional full en-
cryption methods, the proposed method reduces the computational cost to ap-
proximately half. This reduction in the computational cost can therefore save
computational power, storage space, processing time, and transmission band-
width; and, therefore, it would allow more processes to be executed in parallel.
Compared to the 10 rounds 128-bit AES, Salsa20/12 is considerably faster.
On a Core 2 architecture, for example, Salsa20/12 runs at 2.54 cycles/byte for
long streams, while the fastest speed reported for 128-AES is 12.59 cycles/byte
[17]. This implies that Salsa20/12 is almost 5 times faster than the 10 rounds
128-bit AES. Therefore, Salsa20 provides a much better speed-security profile
than AES. To evaluate the encryption speed of the proposed cipher, numerous
encryption timing tests were performed. In addition, to have an accurate bench-
mark result, each timing test was executed 10 times and the average time was
recorded. The results of timing tests demonstrated that the 4 bit-planes selec-
tive encryption methods have speed overheads of 247% on average compared
to Salsa Dance. Also, the full AES schemes have 495% speed overheads com-
pared to Salsa Dance. Table 1 compares the execution time of the encryption
methods. Hence, the experimental results indicate that Salsa Dance has a better
encryption performance than the full and selective encryption using AES.
4 Security Analysis
From the data level point of view, the security of encryption, including the upper
nibble method and the lower nibble method, relies on the security of the encryp-
tion primitive, that is, Salsa20/12. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the
best cryptanalysis breaks 8 out of 20 rounds of Salsa20 to recover the 256-bit se-
cret key in 2251 operations, using 231 keystream pairs [18]. Also, it is conjectured
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that Salsa20 and AES reach security with about the same number of rounds [12].
This means that the upper nibble encryption method offers a high confidentiality
level. In addition, the lower nibble encryption method, that is, the permutation
procedure, is secure as well, because the pseudorandom key stream controlling
the permutation is generated by Salsa20/12. The generated key stream is dif-
ferent even for the same color layer encrypted at different sessions. This makes
the permutation scheme robust to known/chosen plaintext attacks. Hence, the
only attack model applicable to the permutation method is the ciphertext-only
attack [19], in which the attacker can only access the lower nibble-image of the
cipher-image and attempts to recover the lower nibble-image of the original im-
age by trying all possible permutations (4MN possible arrangements in each
color layer). This attack becomes cumbersome and even impractical by increas-
ing the input size MN (This increases the data complexity of the attack).
However, from the semantic level point of view, encrypted texture images
may contain redundant information which may be employed to not only retrieve
the original texture images but also to reconstruct 3D objects. To evaluate the
security of encryption to redundancy based attacks, several measurements were
performed, including a correlation analysis, a key sensitivity analysis, and an
edge detection analysis. Each of these measurements is described in detail in the
following subsections.
4.1 Correlation Analysis
In the texture images, each pixel is highly correlated with its adjacent pix-
els. Therefore, the adversary may study the correlation among the pixels to
determine a meaningful pattern inside the encrypted texture image. An ideal
encryption algorithm should completely dissipate such relationship and produce
cipher-images with no correlation in the adjacent pixels. A correlation of a pixel
with its neighbouring pixel is then given by a 2-tuple (xi, yi) where yi is the adja-
cent pixel of xi. The following equation is used to study the correlation between
two adjacent pixels in horizontal, vertical and diagonal orientations.
corr(x,y) =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=0
(
xi − xi
σx
)(
yi − yi
σy
)
, (8)
where, x and y are intensity values of two neighbouring pixels in the image, n
represents the total number of 2-tuples (xi, yi), and σx and σy represent the
local standard deviation, respectively. To test the impact of encryption by Salsa
Dance on the correlation among the adjacent pixels, we performed several cor-
relation tests. Figure 3 shows the correlation distribution of two adjacent pixels
in the plain-image shown in Figure 2.a and its corresponding cipher-image. It
is observed that neighbouring pixels in the plain-image are highly correlated,
while the neighbouring pixels in the encrypted image are almost uncorrelated.
Table 2 shows the results for correlation coefficients of the ciphers under study.
The numerical results indicate that the correlation coefficients of plain-images
are far apart from cipher-images. Also, results show that the selective/full AES
and Salsa Dance efficiently dissipate the correlation among pixels within each
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Fig. 3. Correlation analysis and distribution of two adjacent pixels in the plain-image
and cipher-image.
color layer. Furthermore, we computed the 2D correlation coefficients between
every two color layers of the encrypted images. Table 3 shows the correlation
coefficients between different color layers of the cipher-images produced by the
AES encryption and Salsa dance. It is observed that that Salsa Dance can reduce
the strong correlation between the color layers much better than the encryption
using 128-bit AES. Hence, the results of the correlation analysis indicate that
compared to the full and selective encryption using 128-bit AES, Salsa Dance
has a better encryption performance and is more robust to redundancy based
attacks.
4.2 Key Sensitivity Analysis
It is possible for an adversary to induce modifications in the secret key via tam-
pering or fault injection [20]. This helps the adversary to observe the redundancy
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Table 3. 2D correlation coefficients between the RGB color layers of the cipher-images
Encryption schemes Selective AES Full AES Proposed (Salsa Dance)
Between R and G 0.3639 0.3237 0.0016
Between R and B 0.3484 0.3041 0.0050
Between G and B 0.3834 0.3041 0.0018
Table 4. Comparison of the PSNR values
Encryption schemes Selective AES Full AES Proposed (Salsa Dance)
between the original and encrypted image
with original key
6.0403dB 6.0345dB 6.0839dB
between the original and encrypted image
with 1-bit different key
6.2709dB 6.1846dB 6.0821dB
between the encrypted images using the
original and modified keys
8.5122dB 8.3964dB 7.7680dB
under different encryption keys and deduce a relationship between the used keys.
To resist such kinds of analyses, a texture image encryption scheme should be
sensitive to changes to the secret key. In other words, a change in a single bit of
the secret key should produce a completely different cipher-image. The more the
visual data is sensitive toward the secret key, the higher would be the amount
of data randomness. To test the key sensitivity of the proposed algorithm, a
number of texture images were encrypted using the selective/full AES and Salsa
Dance with an original secret key (K = 0, IV = 0) and a slightly modified secret
key (K ′ = 1, IV = 0). Numerical results show that the proposed technique is
highly sensitive toward the small alterations of the secret key, that is, a different
cipher-image is produced when the secret key is slightly changed. For compari-
son purposes, we used the PSNR measure. The higher the PSNR, the closer the
images are. Table 4 provides the PSNR values of the encrypted images for the
test image shown in Figure 2.a. It is observed that given the test image shown in
Figure 2.a, encryption by slightly different secret keys creates different cipher-
images by the selective/full AES and Salsa Dance. However, Table 4 shows that
compared to the encryption by selective/full AES, Salsa Dance produces more
dissimilar cipher-images with only 1-bit of change in the secret key. This indi-
cates the high sensitivity of the proposed method to changes of the key, which
makes the analysis of Salsa Dance even harder for the adversary in respect to
finding any relationship between the used keys.
4.3 Edge Detection Analysis
From the semantic point of view, the coarse pattern of the visual data (that
is, the shape information) carries more information than the details. Disclosure
of the shape information not only may help a competent adversary in retriev-
ing the texture image but also may facilitate the reconstruction of underlying
3D objects. Therefore, the adversary would attempt to identify and locate the
boundaries of the protected object within the encrypted texture images. The
object boundaries, as well as sharp variations in surface structure, are typically
manifested by sharp changes in pixel intensities. However, the randomness of en-
crypted images makes the edge detection hard. To this end, the adversary may
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4. Results of edge detection by median and Canny filtering on the encrypted image
of (a) full AES, (b) selective AES, and (c) Salsa Dance.
use nonlinear operations, such as median filtering, to reduce the noise while main-
taining the edges. He/she may then employ gradient and Laplacian operators for
the edge-detection. This information is essential for the correct reconstruction of
3D surfaces [21]. To evaluate the resistance of the proposed texture encryption
scheme to this kind of analysis, we examined the cipher-images using different
edge detection methods [22], including the Canny method. Figure 4 shows the
results of the edge detection analysis on the cipher-images of Figure 2 using the
Canny method. It is observed that Salsa Dance discloses no information about
the shape and boundaries of the underlying 3D object, while the full and selective
encryption using AES cannot resist the edge detection analysis.
5 Conclusion
To overcome the limitations of the current techniques in addressing the confiden-
tiality requirement of texture images, this paper proposes a technical solution
that meets the constraints imposed by the structure of texture images, such as
large data volume, and the application requirements, such as real-time perfor-
mance, complexity, and the security level. The proposed cipher encrypts tex-
ture images by bit masking and a permutation procedure using the Salsa20/12
stream cipher. Compared to the full/selective encryption using 128-bit AES, the
proposed cipher is relatively lightweight and provides a better encryption per-
formance. Salsa Dance also considerably dissipates the correlation among the
entries of the texture image. This annihilates the coarse pattern of the plain-
image and prohibits the data leakage from texture images. The key sensitivity
analysis showed that even a single bit change in the secret key will result in
an entirely different cipher-image. Thus, the original texture image cannot be
recovered even though there is a slight difference between the encryption and
decryption keys. Furthermore, Salsa Dance conceals the shape and boundaries
of the underlying 3D object, while the full and selective encryption using AES
is not secure from the edge detection analysis. Therefore, texture encryption by
Salsa Dance not only maintains the confidentiality of texture images but also
maintains the security of protected 3D models from surface reconstruction at-
tacks using the data provided by the texture images. Due to space limitation,
some preliminary results related to the security of Salsa Dance have been pre-
sented in this paper. Detailed results backed by theory and cryptanalysis will be
presented in the extended version of this paper.
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